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Background: Many Mexicans have begun referring to the foreign debt (deuda externa) as "the
eternal debt" (la deuda eterna). In 1970, Mexico's foreign debt was less than $5 billion. At present,
the debt totals over $100 billion, despite the fact that successive administrations have repaid a total
of $147 billion to foreign creditors since 1970. Based on the current population of 85 million, each
Mexican citizen owes $1,176 to foreign creditors. In recent years, Mexico has been forced to borrow
large sums of money simply to meet interest payments on existing loans. Consequently, most of
the foreign credit contracted by Mexico in the past seven years have provided no benefits to the
national economy. Mexico has been transformed into a net capital exporter, i.e., the country pays out
more than it receives in hard currency. In 1989, Mexico was scheduled to pay $7 billion in principal
and $12 billion in interest to foreign creditors. With foreign currency reserves now estimated as
low as $4 billion, the country would be financially bankrupt within a few months if it attempted to
meet all scheduled payments. The current debt negotiations with an advisory committee in New
York representing Mexico's hundreds of foreign bank creditors are considered vital for present
and future economic health. The talks are also receiving a great deal of attention since Mexico is
perceived as the first "test case" for the US debt reduction initiative, known as the Brady Plan. Some
analysts have delineated three phases in the Mexican government's debt negotiations. The first
was successfully concluded last month when Mexico reached an agreement with the International
Monetary Fund (IMF) for at least $3.625 billion in new loans over three years plus an additional $500
million in "emergency funds" for this year. The second phase was recently wrapped up with the
announcement that the World Bank had agreed to provide a total $1.96 billion in loans. Portions of
both the IMF and the World Bank package are earmarked for supporting debt reduction schemes.
The third phase of the negotiations with Mexico's foreign commercial bank creditors has proven
to be the most complicated. The talks began last month, appeared to get off to a good start with
an agreement to suspend $1.175 billion in principal payments until mid-1990. The talks were then
suspended for a recess. During the first round of the negotiations, Mexico requested an annual net
reduction in capital outflow to creditors equivalent to about 2% of GDP, in contrast to the 6% of GDP
registered in recent years. This reduction could be achieved via a combination of new loans, and
schemes to reduce debt principal, and lowering the interest rate on selected loans, among other
options. Bankers said Mexico's projected financing needs were excessive. Mexico also requested
about $500 million per month in interim financing. The banks rejected this request, arguing that
negotiations for interim financing would be too time-consuming. May 17: The talks resumed in
New York after the 15-bank committee representing Mexico's commercial bank creditors consulted
with the World Bank, the IMF and G-7 nations' governments (US, Britain, Canada, France, Japan,
Italy, and West Germany). Chief negotiator Jose Angel Gurria requested that the bank committee
act quickly on Mexico's request for $24 billion to $27 billion in debt reduction and new loans for
the next six years. The 15-bank advisory committee is chaired by William Rhodes of Citibank. The
major factor underlying the slow pace of negotiations is the banks' demand for "enhancements"
in exchange for making new loans and reducing existing debt. Suggested enhancements are
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guarantees from the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. A banking source told
Notimex that the banks have accepted in principle the notion of capitalizing interest payments,
i.e., interest becomes part of debt principal. May 19: According to a report by Notimex, the most
controversial aspect of the Brady Plan refers to financial guarantees provided by the IMF and the
World Bank. At a meeting this month, finance officials of the G-7 governments agreed to permit
the use of IMF and World Bank funds toward the exchange of existing bank debt paper for lowinterest bonds issued by debtor nation governments. The Financial Times of London reported that
an agreement in principle exists among G-7 governments for the World Bank and the IMF to use
40% of respective quotas to guarantee debt reduction schemes. A Mexican official who requested
anonymity told the New York Times (05/22/89) that his government would not accept a counteroffer
by commercial banks that would provide less than half of the $4.5 billion in new loans, and in debt
reductions. Referring to the Mexican government's proposal, the official said: "This is what we
need for Mexico to grow. If we don't grow we won't have an economic solution." The bankers'
proposal is expected to include a discount for existing loans much lower than the 55% proposed
by Mexico, which is just above the level at which Mexican debt is trading. An unidentified banker
involved in the negotiations told the Times that the bankers are ready to offer debt reduction by
reducing the existing principal and interest, because the agreement could be set up to allow interest
rates to rise as Mexico's economy grows. The bankers are also expected, he said, to propose that
interest owed on old loans to be converted into new long-term loans, i.e., capitalization. The bankers
also expect the Mexican plan to include a proposal for some form of co-financing with the World
Bank of new loans to Mexico. One banker told the Times that Japanese banks were interested in
co-financing. He said the US banks saw the idea as a way "to increase the marketability of the
package" to the more than 300 banks involved in Mexico. The banks also want to be allowed to
use some of the new loans to the Mexican government for financing trade with Mexico. May 22: In
reference to statements by an "unidentified" source from the Mexican negotiating team quoted in
the New York Times (05/22/89), Mexican officials told Notimex that no one among them made such
comments. In a speech to the US Chamber of Commerce in Mexico City, Sen. Edward Kennedy
asserted that Mexican workers cannot continue carrying on their shoulders the results of mistakes
made by the international financial community. Mexico, he said, has done more than its part and
the time has come for others to do theirs. In reference to the Brady Plan, Kennedy said that a 20%
reduction in Third World debt may be too little, too late. He asserted that Mexico should aim for
at least double this amount for the next six years in current negotiations with foreign commercial
banks. The Senator added that all parties concerned cannot afford the "luxury" of erring in favor
of the banks when the result is a "nightmare" of economic depression and political cataclysm.
Kennedy asserted that Third World nations' foreign debt is too important to leave in the hands
of economists and bankers. The debt crisis, he said, is an eminently public and political problem,
and government leaders must act to find a resolution. On debt reschedulings, Kennedy said that
quarterly reevaluations of repayment programs are useful for bank managers, but for debtor
governments these episodes promote instability and make implementation of structural reforms
extremely difficult. An unidentified banker close to the negotiations told Notimex that in terms
of the discount on debt paper acceptable in debt-bond transactions, the banks would considering
a counteroffer of a 30% discount on face value. Mexico has suggested a 55% discount, based on
quotations in secondary markets. At present, Mexican debt paper is quoted at 43 cents to the dollar.
Regarding the exchange of a portion of the old debt for new credits that would pay a 4% interest
rate, the source said that the committee's response would be that the new rates could not be lower
than 6%. May 23: In a communique, the Mexican Finance and Public Credit Secretariat reported that
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chairperson of the US Federal Reserve, Gerald Corrigan, has arranged a May 30 meeting in New
York on behalf of the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, Inter-American Development
Bank, and in cooperation with Mexican Finance Secretary Pedro Aspe. The 15 bank chairpersons on
the bank advisory committee are invited to attend. The purpose of the encounter is to discuss the
quantity of government financial resources channeled via the multilateral organizations to support
debt reduction initiatives, defined as part of Mexico's economic program for the 1989-91 period. May
24: An unidentified source close to the negotiations told Notimex that talks continued but without
concrete results. The source said the issue of greatest importance holding up the talks is the lack
of clear directives on the part of multilateral finance institutions and G-7 regarding how the banks'
debt reduction actions are to receive financial guarantees, not only in the case of Mexico, but for
Latin America as a whole. Both the bank committee and the Mexican government, he said, intend to
produce a final agreement by the end of June. In statements to Notimex, members of the Mexican
negotiating team denied statements by an unidentified banker appearing in media accounts that
Mexico had delivered an ultimatum calling for a counteroffer by the banks on or before May 31. One
member of the team said, "These matters are too serious for ultimatums. This is not the time for the
banks to act precipitously..." He added that there are no "magic dates." (Basic data from Notimex,
05/17-24/89; New York Times, 05/18/89, 05/22/89; Copley News Service, 05/18/89)
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